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Nobody Likes a Sophist Until They Need
One
Eileen A. Scallen*
If I read Professor Eugene Garver's book, For the Sake of
Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief,'
correctly, this may be the most futile essay I have ever written (and some
of them have been pretty futile, believe me). This is because I am a
cheerful, unrepentant, out and proud, latter-day Sophist. At one point,
Gene says, "Aristotle was wiser than Plato in not trying to refute the
sophists. Refuting the sophists is as impossible or as pointless as
refuting the skeptic."2  At another point, Gene notes that "Aristotle
himself does not take the sophists seriously as Plato does. He thinks that
they are so philosophically uninteresting that any practical dangers they
present are not worth extended thought.",3 Ouch.
As one can probably guess, Gene's book does not have nice things
to say about Sophists. Nonetheless, I will continue with this essay
because Gene's overarching thesis about the ethical dimension of
practical reason suggests that he wants to be friends even with us
Sophists-I think. That's good, because I think the world of Gene. He
is a brilliant, humane, engaging scholar, and the kind of man anyone
would be proud to claim as a friend. And I care deeply about the themes
he writes about in the book-rhetoric (small r), Aristotle's Rhetoric
(capital R), practical reason, character, trust and ethics. We touch on so
many common themes in our writing that it startles me-not only legal
argumentation and persuasion, but also the role of trust and betrayal and
the process of confrontation in law and justice, among other topics. So I
was enormously honored to be asked to comment on Gene's book. And I
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1. EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING,
CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF (2004).
2. Id. at 54.
3. Id. at 49.
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still am, even after reading this book, which has challenged and helped
me in so many ways, I cannot possibly discuss them all in this brief
essay. Thus, I will focus on the dimension of Gene's book that I found
highly disturbing because, if ethical rhetoric aims at friendship, Gene
will surely want to know why his arguments bothered me so much. His
arguments disturb me because they do not speak to me-the kind of
person probably most receptive to the arguments in his book.
Before it was published, Gene sent me an electronic version and
page proofs of his book. When I saw the title, I started salivating-I
could not wait to dig in to the feast. Because I did not have a bound copy
of the book at that point, I could realistically start reading almost
anywhere. So, just for fun, I started with the endnotes. Unlike some
people, I love footnotes and endnotes; they provide a chance not only to
provide "authority" for one's argument and supplement the argument's
internal authority, but also to engage in the kind of digressions that can
be enlightening and even entertaining, but that would never be tolerated
in text. I thought it might be fun and interesting to read the endnotes
first-I wanted to see if I could guess Gene's argument from the notes-
like playing the TV game show Jeopardy, where the show provides
contestants with the answers and the game is to formulate the questions.
So, I read the endnotes through in their entirety. And I was stunned to
discover that although Gene's book discusses practical reason, character,
ethics, classical rhetoric and law, Cicero was mentioned only twice-in
one endnote,4 and Isocrates and Quintilian, who wrote fairly extensively
on these topics, were nowhere to be found. I looked closely at endnote
37, and saw that Gene quotes James Baumlin's entry for "ethos" in the
Encyclopedia of Rhetoric as saying that "Cicero ignores the Aristotelian
notion of a 'rational ethos' or 'ethos of trustworthiness' and, in its place,
emphasizes conciliare, or an ethos of sympathy.... Ciceronian ethos
resembles a milder form of pathos." 5 My note in the margin reads
"huh?" Are we talking about THE Cicero? You know, the Roman
lawyer, politician and rhetorical theorist?
But before I could get too bent out of shape about the omissions in
Gene's book, the Massachusetts Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.6 For those
readers who have just returned from a visit to another planet, a 5-4
majority held in Goodridge that: (1) marriage licensing statutes as
currently written are not susceptible of interpretation permitting qualified
4. Id. at 212 n.37.
5. James S. Baumlin, Ethos, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 269 (Thomas 0.
Sloane, ed., 2001) (citation omitted).
6. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses 7; and (2) as a matter of first
impression, limitation of protections, benefits and obligations of civil
marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacks a rational basis and
violates the Massachusetts constitutional equal protection principles.8
Since that decision was handed down in late November, 2003, I have
been engaged in the most important rhetorical battle of my life-as a
lawyer, law professor, activist, lesbian and, yep, Sophist: preventing
amendments to the United States Constitution and the state constitution
of Minnesota (where Gene and I currently live) to outlaw same-sex
marriages and other types of legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
After finishing Gene's book, I realized that these experiences-
discovering the exclusion of my favorite classical rhetoricians (Isocrates,
Cicero and Quintilian) from Gene's book and the legal and cultural battle
over same-sex marriage-presented a good way to explain my difficulty
with Gene's book. First, let's deal with Gene's decision to ignore my
classical pals. Who were they and why does it matter that they were
omitted?9 Isocrates (436 to 338 B.C.E.) was a contemporary and rival of
Plato. Isocrates founded his own school to help Greek citizens learn to
argue and represent their interests in the courts and the legislature. Plato
dismissed Isocrates, as he did writers on similar themes, as an author of
cookbooks-a mere "trainer" who offered to enhance one's technical
skills but who did not teach knowledge and truth. It was easy for Plato to
link Isocrates to the rest of the Sophists because, like them, he expressly
taught legal and political rhetoric. However, Isocrates considered
himself a philosopher; indeed he had his own objections to some of the
Sophists. Isocrates differed from many of these other teachers of rhetoric
7. Id. at 953.
8. Id. at 961.
9. For a longer description of this school of practical reasoning and its relevance to
law, especially legal advocacy and evidence, see Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as
Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 813 (2003); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical
Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995). After many years
of neglect, there is renewed interest in Isocrates. See Eugene Garver, Philosophy,
Rhetoric and Civic Education in Aristotle and Isocrates, in ISOCRATES AND CIVIC
EDUCATION (Takis Poulakos and David Dephew, eds., 2004) (essay in which Professor
Garver argues that Aristotle, rather than Isocrates, ought to continue to be our model for
developing a concept of civic education); EKATERINA V. HASKINS, LOGOS AND POWER IN
ISOCRATES AND ARISTOTLE (2004). See also EDWARD SCHIAPPA, THE BEGINNINGS OF
RHETORICAL THEORY IN CLASSICAL GREECE (1999) (containing an extensive discussion of
Isocrates' contributions to classical rhetoric, portraying him as Exhibit A of the attempts
of philosophers to exclude those, unlike Aristotle and Plato, sought to treat rhetoric as an
integral and worthy element of democracy). On more general interest in classical
rhetoric, there is MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A
LOST HERITAGE (2005). Frost also omits Isocrates, although he does discuss the Romans
Cicero and Quintillian, who credited Isocrates as their inspiration.
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in several respects. For example, many of the Sophists were itinerant
teachers, moving from town to town, taking their shows on the road, so
to speak. In this sense, some of these Sophists were more akin to today's
motivational speakers and Continuing Legal Education presenters who
promise to teach their students, in ten steps or less, to dazzle a jury in any
case. Isocrates, in contrast, founded a school of higher education in
Athens, about 5 years before Plato established his Academy. The school
of Isocrates lasted for over fifty years, where he trained as many as one
hundred students at a time, many of whom became leaders of Athens and
other parts of the ancient Greek world. Plato stigmatized and helped
marginalize his rival Isocrates for a good part of history to date, although
lately there has been renewed interest in Isocrates' teachings. Later, in
ancient Rome, Cicero and Quintilian built on the teaching of Isocrates.
These Romans were practicing lawyers, as well as teachers of the art of
speaking well in court and in the legislature. Quintilian would have
made a good illustration for the cover of Gene's book-since Quintilian
is remembered for defining the ideal orator as "a good man, skilled in
speaking."' 0
But why does it matter that Gene left out my favorite classical
rhetoricians? It matters because these old dead white men, Isocrates,
Cicero and Quintilian, were just as concerned with the problem of
reconciling ethics with rhetoric as Aristotle and Gene Garver. These
ancients: (1) refused to be trapped by the dichotomy drawn by others
between objective truth and radical skepticism; they argued for a middle
ground-a contingent but practical kind of truth, one good enough to
deal with even the most important and difficult issues of society,
especially those decided by the courts of law; (2) understood and
advocated a liberal arts approach to education as the best preparation for
resolving these practical problems in the courts or legislature; and
(3) eschewed an amoral approach to advocacy, but understood that while
good character cannot be instilled through indoctrination, it can be
nurtured and can flourish through inspiration and education.
Isocrates is traditionally treated as a Sophist and certainly was
portrayed as a Sophist by Plato, on whom Gene relies for his description
of the Sophists. I have not seen Cicero and Quintilian described as
Sophists, but I think it is fair to say that Plato and Gene would put them
in that category too, given my description of them above. I regret to say
that the portrait Gene draws of these ancient Sophists is downright
unfriendly. First, it is not friendly to exclude people who rightly should
10. MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILUAN, INSTITUTIONS ORATORIAE [THE INSTITUTES OF
ORATORY] Book XII, para. 1 (H.E. Butler trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1920). Quintilian
actually attributes this phrase to Marcus Cato. Id.
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be part of the debate. Second, it is not friendly to portray a class of
people who had diverse perspectives, ranging from radical relativism to
quite mild pragmatism, as a uniform gang of thugs. Finally, it is not
friendly to allow one side of the debate to speak (entirely) for the other
side.
This is what Gene does when he describes the Sophists exclusively
through his use of Plato's dialogue, the Gorgias.1I In this dialogue,
Callicles the Sophist is interrogated by the noble Socrates. But Plato is
the playwright of this drama, putting arguments in the mouths of
Callicles and the others, and Plato is none too fond of his characters,
except for his former teacher Socrates. Indeed, if I were to use Gene's
thesis, Plato is the most unethical and unscrupulous of rhetoricians by
making his main opponent a straw man. As Gene states:
[A]rguing against a straw man violates no logical rules. The validity
of an argument is the same whether it is directed against views
actually held by an opponent or against a caricature. But ethically it
is not the same argument and does not have the same value. When an
argument is not well motivated, it fails to treat an opponent with
adequate respect and charity. These are intellectual virtues related to
friendship that can be imputed to an argument. They are part of the
ethos of an argument. Good controversial arguments have worthy
targets and treat their targets as worthy opponents.
1 2
Plato fails this standard of ethical rhetoric. By relying on Plato's
portrait and not letting the Sophists of various types speak for
themselves, Gene fails too. He ignores worthy opponents who could
really give his theory a run for the money, such as Isocrates, Cicero and
Quintilian. These ancient writers cared deeply about character and
ethical rhetoric, but they depart from Gene's thesis, which suggests that
ethics and character are intrinsic to rhetoric. They would agree with
Gene that there is such a thing as "ethical rhetoric," and that this ethical
quality stems, in large part, from the character of the speaker. But they
would hold that such character is developed through education and
critical reflection on one's models, and that such civic education is
essential for any hope of leadership in a democracy, which puts a
premium on rhetoric and deliberation. They would disagree with Gene
on a fundamental point: that the standards for such ethical rhetoric or
practical reason are somehow intrinsic to rhetoric itself.
So what does any of this have to with the same-sex marriage
debate? I suggest that these debates will provide scholars, such as Gene
and me, with a perfect contemporary example to use in exploring the
11. PLATO, GORGIAS (E.R. Dodds, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1959).
12. GARVER, supra note 1, at 101.
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dimensions of rhetoric, character and ethics. This essay is not the right
forum to fully develop my alternative to Gene's view here, but I want to
use an example from this debate to suggest why Gene's approach, based
on an Aristotelian concept of political "friendship," will not work as the
ethical standard of practical reason. Gene dismisses the epistemological
and ontological underpinning in Plato's (and later, Aristotle's) treatment
of the Sophists, stating:
It is question-begging to argue for the superiority of rational rhetoric
on the grounds of some ontological or epistemological high theory
about the nature of reality or whether the truth should be spelled with
a capital letter or not.... These claims about reality and knowledge
follow from rhetorical practices, and do not ground them. Arguing
about whether reality exists is simply a way of raising one's voice,
not elevating the things talked about.
13
With all due respect, I think Gene goes astray here, and the current
debate about same sex civil marriage (and other legal protection for
committed partners of the same sex) provides support for my conclusion.
In spring of 2003, about the same time I was thinking deeply about
Gene's thesis, I participated in a "debate" sponsored by our school's
chapters of the Federalist Society, a politically conservative national
group, and the American Constitution Society, a more recent, politically
liberal national organization. The participants included Tom Pritchard,
Executive Director of the Minnesota Family Council, Professor Doug
Kmiec, from Pepperdine Law School, Professor Dale Carpenter, from the
University of Minnesota, and yours truly. All speakers, I am told, were
impressive to members of the audience. But what became clear to me
was the maddening quality of the debate. Sure, I had to sit there and
listen to Mr. Pritchard and -Professor Kmiec tell me and the rest of the
audience that marriage is a natural and God-given status, open to no
tinkering by man-made institutions like courts or legislatures. I had to
listen to them tell me that if I am permitted to marry my partner, then I
could also be permitted to marry my entire Civil Procedure class, my.
brother, my dog and even my couch (I had never heard THAT version of
the argument before). 14
13. 1d. at 51.
14. This argument is a classic example of the logical fallacy called "slippery slope."
The speaker essentially argues that once the listeners take the first step toward a
particular policy option, they will fall down the "slippery slope" to all sorts of bad ends.
Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155
(2005) (analyzing the mechanics of the "slippery slope" argument in the context of same-
sex marriage); Dale Carpenter, Gay Marriage and Polygamy, Independent Gay Forum,
available at http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/carpenter/carpenter46.html (first
published on April 29, 2004, in the Bay Area Reporter) (arguing that same-sex marriage
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But what was truly maddening is that the arguments of my
opponents came not from their "rhetorical practices," as Gene suggests.
No--what was maddening is that those arguments came from the very
foundations of those speakers' cores. They firmly believe that there is
Truth (capital T), and their Truth comes from one particular God as they
interpret that God's message. This foundation, based on external and
unquestioned authority, grounds their rhetorical practices. These
rhetoricians, like Plato, do not engage in rhetoric (from their
perspective). They do not engage in practical reasoning with their
friends; they simply deliver messages from authority. They are conduits
of Truth, not participants in any sort of real dialogue. We know that this
is also the case with Plato. The Gorgias15 and the Phaedrus'6 are not
genuine dialogues of the kind that the historical Socrates is supposed to
have had; they are simply extended speeches by the elite aristocrat Plato,
who serves as our guide to Truth.
When speakers such as Tom Pritchard, Doug Kmiec and Plato base
their speech in unquestionable authority, universal Truth, how can we
possibly debate them? Gene might say this is futile. Don't bother. It
would only be an exercise in who can speak the loudest; their "claims
about reality and knowledge follow from rhetorical practices, and do not
ground them."' 7  But their claims do ground them. And it is their
grounding in this solid, unimpeachable authority that attracts listeners
longing for conviction, predictability and clarity. Does this certainty
provide a false sense of security? From my perspective, and I think from
Gene's too, it does. But that does not diminish the power of the siren's
call of certainty.
Professor Francis J. Mootz III has noted the futility of debates
between those who base their claims on foundationalist notions of Truth
and those who do not. In his review of Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna
Sherry's book, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in
American Law, Professor Mootz argues that Professors Farber and
Sherry re-enact the Plato vs. Sophist battle in their book condemning
"radical multiculturalism" in the legal academy.1 8 Professor Mootz
argues that rehashing this ancient debate "is unproductive and even
meets an essential need for the individuals involved and benefits society while polygamy,
by contrast, does neither).
15. PLATO, supra note 11.
16. PLATO, PHAEDRUS (Robin Waterfield, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
17. GARVER, supra note 1 at 51.
18. Francis J. Mootz III, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in
American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 605, 608-09 (1998) (reviewing
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)).
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harmful to scholarly discourse." 19 Instead, he proposes that we embark
on "an effort to reclaim reason in American legal scholarship by steering
a course between the dogmatic pursuit of truth and the self-indulgent
pursuit of provocation.
' 20
I take a slightly different direction than Professors Garver and
Mootz. I agree that these debates have no definitive winner and are
frustrating, even maddening, experiences. This is because individuals
who are even willing to consider "the rhetorical turn" or Gene Garver's
concept of "political friendship" express an openness to genuine dialogue
that will never be found among the pure rationalists, strict empiricists,
and pseudo-Platonists. Those who respect only foundationalist notions
of objective truth stemming from their preferred authority are not open to
persuasion, only "enlightenment." They will not argue with us. They
will not listen to us because the only speaker that matters is their source,
their authority. They will only "inform" or "instruct" us on the issues at
hand. As a result, they are the most likely candidates to deny that they
are employing "mere" rhetoric because, for them, the meaning (of a
contract, a statute, the Constitution) is "plain." In short, the
epistemology and ontology matter deeply here because they ground my
debating opponent's rhetoric, as well as mine. And this is what produces
the frustration: two earnest and well-intentioned debating opponents who
cannot communicate with each other.
So what is a good Sophist to do? Keep talking. And I did debate
those opponents of same sex marriage and other legal protection for
same-sex families. I used my best effort to invite my audience to keep
an open mind, to recognize that our legal, social and cultural reality does
evolve over time. In good neo-Aristotilian fashion, I used logos: several
examples of the history of "traditional" aspect of marriage that made
women an appendage of their husband, with no independent legal status,
a "tradition" that was forced to change with recognition of equality for
women. I used pathos to describe how heart-broken I was to have to
leave a job and a city I loved because I could not adequately protect my
partner's financial security by marrying her. And I used my ethos: I told
my students my story, and came out to them in a more direct and honest
fashion than I ever have. Time will tell the outcome of the same-sex
marriage controversy. But by engaging in the debate, I gave my larger
audience a chance to use their ability to reason and criticize, to make
critical judgments based on a difference of opinion, evidence and
argument-something my opponents (grounded in the foundation of
authority) do not. I can offer a competing model of rhetoric to my
19. Id. at 608.
20. Id. at 609.
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audience (which contains many of my law students) that does not
command my audience to obey, but instead respects their intelligence
and offers them a chance to grow through the use of their own critical
judgment. Exercising critical judgment is essential to the success of our
democratic system.
I am not the first to suggest that good rhetoric can only flourish in a
well-educated democracy. History shows that this is the case. Whenever
a society is ruled by autocrats or dictators, one of the first freedoms to be
curtailed is the freedom of speech, and theorizing about rhetoric and the
practice of rhetoric disappears therewith. It is not an accident that with
the fall of democracy in ancient Greece and Rome, and the rise of
dictators, kings, and Popes, the concept of "rhetoric" was utterly
transformed from a philosophical and educational activity to a
constricted set of precepts of style.21 And, as new democracies have
risen, so too has interest in rhetoric. Democracy has not just been spread
by the superior weapons of the army behind it; democracy is inspired by
the eloquence of "good men" (and women) "speaking well." Democracy
is won and supported by citizens who have been liberally educated and
encouraged to engage in critical thinking and speaking. Democracy is
protected not only by those who speak well, but also by those who listen
well and to diverse sources of information, values and needs.
Democracy is strengthened not by those who act with certainty and raw
power, but by those who make the best possible judgments in an
uncertain world with limited knowledge.
Gene Garver's notion of a political "friendship" as the foundation of
an ethical rhetoric works only in a utopian society. It does not
sufficiently confront the serious reality that there are those for whom
"friendship" is just another tool to use as one pursues ends dictated by
authority. It is good to dream. It may be the philosopher's prerogative to
dream. But, as a lawyer and law professor engaged in practical
reasoning right this moment, I can only let go a dreamy sigh as I ponder
Gene's book before I head off to another debate.
21. For two of the many books tracing the correlation between the rise and fall of
democracy and the role of rhetorical theory, see GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN
TIMES 31-32 (1980); THE RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO
THE PRESENT (Patricia Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg, eds., 1990).
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